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China’s challenges to future sustainable economic growth and the 




The ‘stunning comeback’ of China after almost two centuries is one of the 
most significant trends affecting Western economies, particularly the United 
States (US). None of the key drives that have promoted China’s growth are 
really at risk if the Chinese government does not deviate from its present 
economic policy and keeps up gradual refinement of its unique and effective 
social-capitalist model. The real risks to China’s future growth are remaining 
poverty, the unbalanced and unsustainable growth model, bureaucracy, and 
the corruption of government officials. China’s government is taking 
determined steps to solve these challenges. The great challenge for the US 
is its large accumulated debt with China, and the need for additional 
borrowing to finance its massive economic stimulus plan. There is little 
doubt that US will (after solving the financial crisis of 2008 with China’s 
help) continue to be one of the most powerful nations in the world. 
Nevertheless, it will have to learn to share the world leadership with other 
countries, particularly with China, Europe and other fast growing developing 
countries. Gone is the absolute dominance of the US (in terms of ideas and 
money), and its use of the International Monetary Fund and World Bank as 
vehicles to spread its influence and market economy model over the 
developing world. 
 
Keywords: China’s economic transformation, China’s social-capitalism, 
China’s challenges to economic growth, China’s remaining poverty, China’s 
corruption, China’s unsustainable growth model, US accumulated debt, 
inflation and devaluation of the dollar. 
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China’s ‘stunning comeback’ 
The stunning comeback of China, after almost two centuries, is 
restoring its status as the largest economy of the world during the 21
st 
century. This comeback has had a significant impact on Western economies, 
particularly that of the United States (US).  
At the beginning of the 19
th century, China’s Celestial Empire was the 
largest economy in the world, with a Gross Domestic Product (GDP) that 
exceeded that of Western Europe, Japan, the US, and Russia combined 
(Malkiel et al., 2008, p. 21). At this time, when Great Britain was laying the 
groundwork for European industrial revolution, there was a stillness and 
immobility within China. The Celestial Empire saw itself as the world’s 
premier entity in terms of size, population, age and experience; and as 
untouchable in its cultural achievements, as well as its moral, spiritual, and 
intellectual superiority.  
 
China’s splendid history 
The Chinese developed porcelain, gunpowder, the wheelbarrow, the 
compass, the stirrup, the spinning wheel and paper. They built huge ships 
to navigate and trade all over the Pacific and Indian Ocean, almost a 
century before the Europeans. They may have discovered and mapped 
America before Columbus (Menzies, 2002) and Leonardo da Vinci’s 
inventions may have been copied from the Chinese (Menzies, 2008): and 
yet China has never seemed to capitalize on these discoveries.  
Possessing a powerful centralized government, based on the peace and 
serenity of Confucius’s teaching, China perfected a rigorous civil service 
examination system in which anyone could participate, regardless of social 
background. This created a monolithic society that nevertheless dampened 
competition and scientific advancement. Education came to be viewed as 
the path to advancement in civil service, rather than an instrument for 
encouraging free inquiry and the consequent development of science and 
technology. The best and the brightest were selected into government 
services, and shunned commerce. This trend occurred because in the 
Confucian social ranking places scholar-bureaucrats at the top, followed by 6 
    
the farmers, the artisans, and, last of all, the despised merchants. By 
contrast, entrepreneurship has been celebrated in Europe as opening a 
unique path to riches, where irreverence, creativity and daring were the 
‘sine qua non’ of success. In this way, China imposed isolation upon itself, 
and remained uninvolved in the enormous change occurring in Europe as a 
result of the industrial revolution. 
However, this immobility of China did not mean that it did not 
understand the market economy, or the importance of foreign trade and 
capitalism. Professor Chow (2007, p. 22) has explained that China has a 
long history of a market economy, the operation of which was well 
understood as described by the great historian Sima Qian (ca. 135 or 145 
BC to 86 BC) in the Han dynasty (2006 BC to 220 AD). Foreign trade 
flourished in the Tang dynasty (618 to 907 AD), as evidenced in the ‘Silk 
Route’, and during the early Ming dynasty (1368 to 1644 AD) extensive 
overseas exploration and trade stimulated economic development, which 
permitted enormous construction projects, including the ‘Forbidden City’ in 
Beijing. China had evidenced a fairly mature form of capitalism since the 
Song dynasty (960 to 1279 AD) and is attributed with the first generally 
circulating paper money (dates from Chinese chronology: Jin, 2003, p.255). 
 
China’s ‘Century of Humiliation’ 
From the second half of the 19
th century, China’s economic importance 
in the world began to decline. Western colonial powers, led by England, took 
advantage of their superior military technology to exploit and plunder 
China, forcing it to submit to colonial dominance, in what the Chinese 
historians call the ‘Century of Humiliation’ (Malkiel et al., 2008, p. 23-28). 
This exploitation ended with Mao Zedong’s (1893 to 1976) communism in 
1949. The adoption of the Soviet Marxist Economic Model by Mao Zedong 
(promoted by him and his followers as the ‘Great Leap Forward’), was a 
disaster, culminating in the ‘Three Bitter Years’. These years (from 1958 to 
1961) produced the largest known famine in the world, with an estimated 
death of 20 to 30 million Chinese. After this disaster, and aggravated by the 
‘Cultural Revolution’ that produced a decade of confusion and repression 7 
    
(from 1966 to 1976), came unprecedented economic growth, initiated by 
Deng Xiaoping’s (1904 to 1997) economic reforms in 1978 (Malkiel et al., 
2008, p. 29-39). This growth, at an astounding average of 10 percent per 
year over the last 30 years, is only comparable in its global significance to 
the emergence of the United States as an economic giant during the 19th 
century (dates from Chinese chronology: Jin, 2003, p.255). 
 
Deng Xiaoping’s economic liberalization 
When Deng Xiaoping took control of the Communist Party in 1978, he 
initiated reforms to the planned economy system introduced by Mao 
Zedong, toward establishing a more market-oriented economy. These initial 
reforms were partially a continuation of the ‘Four Modernizations’ (these 
were science and technology, agriculture, industry and defense) initiated by 
Premier Zhou Enlai (1898 to 1976) in 1964, and interrupted by the ‘Cultural 
Revolution’ in 1966 (Chow, 2006, p. 47). In 1978, China was ready for 
these reforms: the excesses of the ‘Cultural Revolution’ made the 
Communist Party and the government extremely unpopular; in distancing 
themselves from it they were able to regain the support of the people. The 
communist party of that time understood the need for change after the 
disaster of the ‘Great Leap Forward’ (the planned economy system copied 
from the Soviet Marxist Economic Model by Mao Zedong), and the economic 
success of the ‘Four Asian Tigers’ (Taiwan, Hong Kong, Singapore and South 
Korea) during this time indicated to them (and to the Chinese people), that 
market economies were more efficient for generating growth and progress 
than the planned economies of the Soviet or Eastern Bloc. 
In the first years of the economic liberalization, entrepreneurship 
flourished in China, bringing an increase in corruption. Unemployment rose 
as inefficient state-owned enterprises were forced to adapt to the new 
competitive environment. Students, with their new freedom, began protests 
for political reform, and these protests culminated in the demonstration at 
the Tiananmen Square in Beijing in the summer of 1989. Den Xiaoping 
believed that an uncontrolled political reform (such as was being conducted 
in the Soviet Union), would be disastrous for China, and decided to repress 8 
    
the demonstration (Malkiel et al., 2008, p. 38). His decision was justified a 
year later, when the Soviet Union dissolved into many different states with 
a corruption riddled market economy that is yet to provide the expected 
benefits to its people. At the same time, some members of the Communist 
Party felt that Den Xiaoping was too soft and progressive, and the resultant 
fierce political in-fighting forced internal repression and economic 
retrenchment. For these reasons, foreign investment was withdrawn, and 
economic activity was reduced. 
 
Den Xiaoping: “to get rich is glorious!” 
In 1992, in defiance to traditionalists in the Communist party, Den 
Xiaoping (at the advanced age of 92) made the epic “Southern China Tour”, 
reminding people that the old days were not good, and that conditions in 
the future should be much better. He advocated that the pace of the 
economic reform be accelerated. During the trip he famously told people 
that “to get rich is glorious!” (Malkiel et al., 2008, p. 38). The population 
responded with enthusiasm, and his detractors in Beijing could not ignore 
the message. With this trip, Den Xiaoping restarted China on its remarkable 
transformation, leading to it becoming the second largest economy in the 
World (with a GDP only surpassed by the US), when measured on the basis 
of purchasing power parity (World Bank, 2009). As China has begun to 
engage in the global economy, there is an awareness of the humiliating 
lessons of past dealings with the West, and thus this expansion is 
undertaken according to strict terms and conditions; China is clearly 
determined to maintain its economic and diplomatic independence as it 
develops its unique model of social-capitalism.  
While this model of social-capitalism has brought tremendous wealth 
and opportunity to its people, it is also clear that the economic reforms 
started by Den Xiaoping are a unique experiment that still requires further 
refinement as China continues to return to its position as one of the world’s 
leading nations. There are tremendous economic and social challenges, and 
risks to be overcome in the future to reach this goal, particularly toward 9 
    
improving the livelihood of the entire population of over 1.3 billion, and not 
only that of the privileged minority. 
 
China’s unique social-capitalism 
The unique nature of the Chinese economic model of social-capitalism 
as developed by Deng Xiaoping, lies in the fact that it results in neither a 
market economy (where prices and transactions are solely determined by 
individual consumers and producers), or a planned economy (where all 
prices and transactions are under government control): these two extremes 
are the capitalist and the socialist economic models. China is refining its 
particular social-capitalist economic model in the middle of these two 
extremes, with a mixture of state-owned and private-owned enterprises, 
and this change is occurring in the context of a complex bureaucratic 
government structure.  
Another insight by Den Xiaoping was the need to promote and support 
entrepreneurship, in order to fuel economic growth and progress 
(encapsulated in his famous saying “to get rich is glorious!”). His approach 
echoed Schumpeter’s (1942) thesis that without entrepreneurs acting as 
‘agents of creative destruction’, there is no real economic growth and 
progress; the inference is that the pure socialist model was doomed to 
failure, because it did not promote entrepreneurship. 
 
China’s stunning success 
In the past thirty years, China has transformed itself from an 
economically and technologically backward nation, into one of the world’s 
most dynamic economies. It has opened its doors to new ideas and 
techniques, introduced competition to all aspects of production, 
strengthened its commitment to widespread education, and taken 
advantage of the opportunities offered by its World Trade Organization 
(WTO) membership in December 2001. The results of this have been 
dramatic for both China and the United States (US). From 2001 to 2008 the 
US exports to China rose from United States Dollars (USD) 19.2 billion to 10 
  
71.5 billion, and imports from China rose from USD 102.3 billion to 337.8 
billion (Table 1). The Chinese in 2006 displaced the US as the second 
trading nation in the world, and are now only behind Germany (WTO, 
2009).  
 





1999  2000  2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006  2007  2008    
US Exports  13.1  16.3  19.2  22.1  28.4  34.7  41.8  55.2  65.2  71.5 
%  change  -8 24.4 18.3 15.1 28.5 22.2 20.6 32.1 18.1  9.5 
US Imports  81.8  100  102.3  125.2  152.4  196.7  243.5  287.8  321.5  337.8 
% change  14.9  22.3  2.2 22.4 21.7 29.1 23.8 18.2 11.7  5.1 
Total  94.9  116.3  121.5  147.3  180.8  231.4  285.3  343  386.7  409.2 
%  change  11 22.6 21.4 21.2 22.8 28 23.3 20.2 12.7  5.8 
US Balance  -68.7  -83.7  -83  -103.1  -124  -162  -201.6  -232.5  -256.3  -266.3 
 
Note: US exports reported on FOB basis; imports on a general customs value, CIF basis 
 
Sources: US International Trade Commission, US Department of Commerce, and US Census 
Bureau  (copied: http://www.uschina.org/statistics/tradetable.html). 
 
Currently, the Chinese have one of the highest savings rates in the 
world, around 40 percent of the Gross National Product (GDP) (Figure 1). 
This contrasts sharply with the US, where the saving rate is close to zero. In 
other words, on average, the Chinese save more than they spend, while in 
the United States spending has, on average, overtaken saving. As a 
consequence, the Chinese economy is awash in capital from savings, 
looking for investment opportunities. This capital has been used for 
modernizing production, which in turn has increased profitability and 
generated more capital.  
The government also took advantage of the abundance of capital to 
improve the country’s infrastructure, and this has in turn fueled economic 
growth. For example, China now has the only commercially operated Maglev 
train in the world. The train operates in Shanghai between the city and the 11 
  
airport at speeds up to 260 miles per hour using magnets to elevate it 
above the track. 
 
Figure 1. The Share of export, consumption and gross capital ormation in 
China in 2007 
 




Some recent statistics illustrate the growing success of the Chinese 
economy. China has been the fastest-growing major nation for the past 
quarter of a century, with an average GDP growth rate above 10%. In 
2005, the Chinese per capita income (GDP per head) was only $1,700, 
compared with the $42,000 of the US. In 2008, the Chinese estimated per 
capita income rose to $2,900 and the US rose to $46,700. The per capita 
income gap decreased from twenty-five to one in 2005 to sixteen to one in 
2008. This reduction was accomplished in only three years (World Bank, 
2009, April). 
As previously stated, China is now the second largest economy in the 
world (after the US) with a GDP of USD 7.8 trillion in 2008 (when measured 
on the basis of purchasing power parity). The IMF (April 2009) reported that 
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in 2008 China was the third largest economy (after the US and Japan) when 
measured using exchange-rate: with a nominal GDP of USD 4.4 trillion. The 
Chinese foreign exchange reserve is now around USD 1.3 trillion, and China 
is the largest investor in US treasury bonds. According to some estimates, 
80% of the Chinese foreign exchange reserve is in USD. The Chinese per 
capita income has been growing at an average annual rate of more than 8% 
over the last three decades, resulting in a drastic reduction in poverty. 
However, this rapid growth has been accompanied by rising income 
inequality. 
 
China’s growing influence 
China's influence in the world economy remained minimal until the late 
1980s. At that time, the economic reforms started in 1978 began to 
generate a significant and steady growth in investment, consumption and 
standards of living. China now participates extensively in the world market, 
and its larger companies, such as Galanz and Haier, have begun to play a 
major role in the world economy. Galanz, with its aggressive price strategy 
based on disruptive innovation, has captured 40 percent of the global 
market, with a 45 percent share in Europe, and more that 70 percent in 
South America and Africa. Building on this success, Galanz began to 
compete in the market for air conditioners and rice cookers, and has stated 
an aim to be the world’s largest manufacturer of these items in the near 
future (Hexter & Woetzel, 2007, p. 194-195). Similarly, the Chinese 
appliance manufacturer Haier has become a global competitor, based on an 
aggressive innovation strategy that focuses on three key capabilities: 
design, manufacture and distribution.  The aggressiveness of Haier’s 
innovation plan can be seen in its stated objectives: two successful 
intellectual patent applications for every working day. Today, Haier is a 
dominant player in the appliance world market, selling in over 30 countries, 
with a product line of 96 appliance categories (DiPaola & Li, 2007, p. 3). 
China has become the world’s second largest consumer of luxury 
goods, surpassing in the US in 2008 and currently second only to Japan. 
The demand for luxury items in China is growing at the rate of 20% 13 
    
annually. China has an estimated 18 thousand billionaires, 440 thousand 
millionaires, and a fast rising middle class of around 250 million who have 
high purchasing power and are eager to spend in luxury goods (Morisset & 
Lee, 2008). China now has 170 cities with more than one million 
inhabitants, compared to the US, who has only ten cities of this size. There 
are over 400 million Chinese subscribers to wireless phone services, 
representing 100 million more that the entire population of the US (Malkiel 
et al., 2008, p. 44). 
 
Reasons for the economic success of China 
To evaluate the future challenges and risks to China’s unprecedented 
economic growth over the past three decades, it is important to understand 
the reasons for the extraordinary success of the economic reforms started 
by Deng Xiaoping. As mentioned previously, the Communist Party, 
government and people where ready for the reforms, however this only 
accounts for the enthusiastic acceptance of the reforms, and not their 
success. This success was a direct function of the way these reforms were 
executed: the Chinese leaders were pragmatic in approach, rather than 
guided by ideology. The phrase “one should not care whether a cat is black 
or white as long as it catches mice”, attributed to Deng Xiaoping, clearly 
illustrates this pragmatism and lack of ideological constraints. 
The government did not have a formal plan or model for the reforms. 
Policies were adopted, tested, adapted, or even abandoned through 
experimentation. This process of learning by trial-and-error was described 
by Deng Xiaoping using an old Chinese proverb, “crossing the river while 
feeling the rocks”. Due to the lack of a formal planning or models, and the 
use of experimentation, the reforms were implemented gradually in a step-
by-step approach. This ‘gradualism’ in making the necessary reforms from a 
planned economy to a Chinese style or pragmatic market economy 
contrasted substantially with the ‘shock therapy’ approach adopted by the 
Soviet Union and some Eastern European countries at that time. These 
countries, after the fall of the Berlin wall in 1989, adopted a US style liberal 
market economy immediately, without the necessary preparation and 14 
    
transition. The consequence was significant economic disruption and 
corruption, with many of their citizens disillusioned with the market 
economy and supportive of a return to the old communist regimes. 
 
Communist Party leadership 
The majority of the Chinese people, and most of the government 
officials who had lived the planned economic disaster of the ‘Great Leap 
Forward’ and the ‘Cultural Revolution’, supported the economic reforms 
toward a market economy. This support for the reforms helped to maintain 
the necessary political stability and strengthen the power of the Communist 
Party leadership under Deng Xiaoping. This acceptance and legitimization of 
the Communist Party leadership in governing China is also part of the 
Chinese culture, and is based on the teachings of Confucius, which promote 
hard work, honesty and trustworthiness in human relations. Chinese culture 
also has an emphasis on family and social order, with a high value attached 
to the common good as opposed to individual rights, and a respect for the 
hierarchically superior scholar-bureaucrats that managed the powerful 
centralized government of Imperial China for almost two thousand years. 
These scholar-bureaucrats were selected according to a rigorous 
examination system, started in the Sui and Tang dynasties (581to 907), 
and perfected during the Song dynasty (960 to 1126). They were based on 
Confucian teachings, in which anyone could participate, regardless of social 
background. This tradition of selecting civil servants based on meritocracy is 
to some extent replicated in the selection of the members of the Communist 
Party that governs today’s modern China, and this explains the easy 
acceptance by the Chinese people of those selected as the ruling 
bureaucracy (dates from Chinese chronology: Jin, 2003, p.255). 
 15 
    
 
China’s growth drives 
Bergsten et al. (2006, p. 19), under the auspice of the Center for 
Strategic and International Studies and the Institute for International 
Economics, has identified five drives as key to China’s stunning 
transformation over the past three decades: “The embrace of marked 
forces, the opening of the economy to trade and inward direct investment, 
high level of savings and investments, the structural transformation of the 
labor force, and investment in primary school education.” They identify that 
none of these key drives are at risk if the Chinese government does not 
deviate from its present economic policy and maintains its gradual 
refinement of its unique and effective social-capitalist model. Nevertheless, 
they identify that to sustain its economic growth, China will have to manage 
and overcome two important hurdles: to continue with the reform of its 
state-owned enterprises, and to improve its financial system for more 
efficient capital allocation. These hurdles will be evaluated below. 
 
China’s state-owned enterprises 
China has already made tangible progress in reforming its state-owned 
enterprises (created in the 1950’s when Mao Zedong abolished private 
ownership). Today there are approximately 150 well known state-owned 
enterprises that report directly to the central government, such as the 
China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC) and the State Grid 
Corporation of China (SGCC). Woetzel (2008) has explained that besides 
these well known state-owned enterprises, there are thousands more that 
fall into a grey area; there are the subsidiaries of these 150 that are 
controlled by the central government, and enterprises owned by provincial 
and municipal governments, as well as those who are partially privatized, 
with the state as a majority or influential shareholder (this last group 
includes companies such as the computer manufacturer Lenovo and the 
appliance giant Haier). Similarly, the majority shareholder for the 
automaker Chery is the municipal government of Wuhu. 16 
    
Since the 1980s, the Chinese government and the Communist Party 
have followed a policy of separating government functions from business 
operations. This policy has been applied efficiently using the Chinese 
approach of gradualism: first to the consumer industry, then to high-tech 
and heavy manufacturing, and more recently to banking. As a result, 
government favoritism toward state-owned enterprises is fading. Woetzel 
(2008) has argued that global leaders (in both public and private sectors), 
must recognize the importance of taking a nuanced view of China’s state-
owned enterprises. On closer inspection, many are quite different from the 
state-owned stereotype of inefficiency, and companies with majority state-
ownership (such as Haier) often prove to be operating at a world–class 
level. 
 
China’s financial system 
The Chinese financial system arguably requires a more efficient 
approach to the allocation of capital. Farrell et al. (2006, p. 9-10) have 
stated that the principal task of a good financial system is to attract savings 
and channel these to productive investments. In their McKinsey Global 
Institute Report, they have noted that China’s financial system is very 
efficient in attracting savings from the population, but has considerable 
room for improvement in its capital allocation, and in its overall efficiency. 
They have claimed that their suggested reforms could raise the GDP by 13 
percent, and would help spread China’s new wealth more evenly throughout 
the country. They have also explained that the caution of China’s regulators 
in shifting funding toward more productive private companies is a result of 
their fear that this could accelerate layoffs in the less productive state-
owned enterprises, and so lead to more social unrest. They have argued 
against this approach, and suggested that such a shift will stimulate job 
creation in the stronger areas of China’s economy, and that the increased 
tax revenues from stronger private companies could fund social programs 
that would help relieve social tension.  
This study by Farrell et al. (2006) has also outlined out that, as a 
consequence of the caution of the Chinese regulators, the state-owned (or 17 
    
partially state-owned) enterprises have absorbed the lion share of the 
available funding from the financial system. Private companies, having not 
received sufficient funding from the underdeveloped financial system, and 
thus have frequently resorted to the large informal lending market for their 
financial needs: besides being illegal, this market charges very high 
interest. Due to the 2008 financial crisis, the Chinese regulators have 
accelerated the necessary reforms, and already in 2009 China has arguably 
become the largest market in the world for initial public offerings (IPOs), as 
a source of funding for its private companies. 
 
Risks to China’s future growth 
The real risks to China’s future growth are identified as being the 
remaining poverty, an unbalanced and unsustainable growth model, and the 
bureaucratic approaches and corruption of government officials. These three 
major risks to China’s future are examined below. 
 
China’s remaining poverty 
Since Den Xiaoping began the economic reforms in 1978, more than 
600 million Chinese have been lifted out of poverty. The living conditions of 
the people have been dramatically improved over these years, with income 
levels growing steadily. Between 1978 and 2007, urban disposable income 
per capita increased from 343.4 Yuan to 13,785.8 Yuan, while rural incomes 
grew from 133.6 Yuan to 4,140.4 Yuan. This is a more than six-fold 
increase (for both), even after adjustment for inflation (United Nations, 
2008, p. 9). 
The share of food spending for urban and rural residents fell from 57.5 
percent to 36.3 percent and from 67.7 percent to 43.1 percent, 
respectively, between 1978 and 2007; the emphasis on overall spending 
has shifted from a focus on basic needs such as food and clothing, to more 
diverse consumption patterns including housing, travel, education, culture 
and health. The occurrence of extreme poverty in rural areas has fallen 
from 250 million to 14.79 million people, while public goods and services 18 
    
(such as universal primary education, public and basic health care, and 
cultural facilities) have been greatly expanded (United Nations, 2008, p. 9). 
 
China’s widening income gap 
Unfortunately, not all of the population is equally benefiting from this 
extraordinary progress, and China’s income inequality is widening. The per 
capita income ratio between urban and rural residents dropped from 2.6 to 
1 in 1978 to 1.9 to 1 in 1985, then rose to 3.3 to 1 in 2007. China’s income 
inequality is now the second highest in Asia, and is reaching levels that pose 
risks for the sustainability of future development. Such gaps are particularly 
critical in view of the increasing burden placed on individuals, in terms of 
paying for services such as healthcare and higher education. These figures 
suggest that income inequalities have led to disparities in access to key 
public services in China (United Nations, 2008, p. 13-14). Nevertheless, the 
Chinese income inequality is still low compared with Latin America (and this 
inequality has created strong political instabilities in Venezuela, Ecuador and 
Bolivia, and is threatening other countries). 
The rise of inequality is the result of the market forces that have 
generated China’s strong growth. The economist Arthur Levis (1954) has 
suggested that “development must be inegalitarian because it does not start 
in every part of the economy at the same time.”  The reason for this, 
according to his model (1954, p. 140-141), is the dualism of the labor 
market. In this model, one group (the modern, industrial, capitalist, formal, 
or urban approaches) can capture the full benefits of the economic 
development; and the other (the subsistence, informal, traditional, 
agricultural, or rural approaches) will benefit less from this development. 
This polarity has occurred China. Prior to Deng Xiaoping’s reform of 1978, 
there was almost no financial reward for education, and in most cases taxi 
drivers made more money than university professors. This changed 
dramatically with the economic reforms. The financial rewards for education 
rose dramatically, leaving the uneducated, and specially the rural population 
behind. This trend can obviously be reversed if the whole population has 
reasonable access to education. 19 
    
Reversing this widening income gap would help to prevent the political 
unrest of the underprivileged, especially from the rural areas. Nevertheless, 
achieving this is difficult, and remains one of major challenges for the 
Chinese Government in the coming years. In recent years, there has been 
increasing unrest among those excluded from the current economic boom, 
reflected in the frequent police encounters with protestors in Chinese 
villages and among minorities. The Wall Street Journal stated that the 
rioting by Uighurs in July 2009, in Xinjiang's capital Urumqi, put the 
international spotlight back on China's handling of its ethnic minority 
regions (Restall, 2009, July10). However, it would be a mistake to interpret 
this as a sign that China's control over its ethnic minorities is loosening. 
Rather, these incidents show the broader context of rising tensions within 
Chinese society.  
Nevertheless, this unrest remains markedly different from that in Latin 
America, where anger is directed against free market economies and foreign 
investments. In China people appear to be fully convinced of Deng 
Xiaoping’s assertion that “to be rich is glorious!”, and the Chinese protesters 
desire education, and their share of the country’s growing wealth generated 
by the free market economy. 
 
China’s solution to the income gap is growth 
The financial crisis of 2008 represented a challenge to the ability of the 
Chinese economic growth solution to maintain political stability. This crisis 
has also created the additional risk of unrest in the cities, as consequence of 
the rising urban unemployment: particularly amongst the large contingent 
of students that are leaving the universities and are not finding adequate 
jobs. This year alone, more than six million new graduates are entering the 
employment market (The Economist, April 8
th 2009, p. 40). 
 
China’s unsustainable future growth 
The extraordinary growth of the Chinese economy was based on three 
economic drivers: net exports, domestic consumption, and public and 20 
    
private capital investments. In 2007, according to the preliminary numbers 
from The National Bureau of Statistics of China (The People’s Bank of China, 
2007, p. 18), net export contributed 21.5 percent to GDP growth, domestic 
consumption contributed 39.7 percent, and gross capital formation 
contributed 38.8 percent (see Figure 1) . These figures indicate that the 
Chinese Government must change emphasis on the growth drivers of the 
GDP if they want to continue growing at a similar pace to the previous thirty 
years.  
The huge increase in US current account imbalance, with the 
consequent emergence of huge surpluses in emerging economies (led above 
all by China) remains a problem. The US arguably cannot continue with an 
uncapped rise in government debt or profligate private borrowing, and its 
only alternative is to earn it way out with a big rise in net exports. This 
means that China must strongly expand demand for imports, relative to 
supplying exports (Wolf, 2009). Economists believe that such shifts in the 
growth drivers are both feasible and likely as domestic income rises. 
Consumer spending in China today is around 40 percent of GDP, as 
opposed to 70 percent in the US. Even while maintaining a high savings 
rate, Chinese people on average can substantially increase their 
consumption (Malkiel and Taylor, 2008, p. 86). This consumption growth 
will be pushed by the younger generation (known collectively as the ‘young 
emperor generation’, and also called the ‘me generation’). This generation 
includes those born after the market reform started in 1978, and after the 
‘one child’ policy was introduced in 1979. Typically, they have grown up 
indulged by their parents, who doted on them as a single child, and this was 
assisted enthusiastically by the grandparents. They are characterized as 
self-centered, frequently self-indulgent, and the most avid and savvy 
consumers. This generation is therefore driving demand in China, buying 
everything from expensive watches to imported cars (Degen, 2009, June 
17, p. 1 and 6). 
There also is the possibility for China to continue growing the economy 
for awhile longer, with room for substantial investment in infrastructure. In 
particular, there are still large investments required for the development of 21 
    
the western region of the country. The vast investments in infrastructure 
made in the last thirty years are credited with allowing China to grow at a 
much faster pace than India. 
 
Corruption in China 
The corruption of officials, who profit personally from public office, 
exists throughout the world to differing degrees, and Transparency 
International (TI, 2009) is a nonprofit organization that surveys the world’s 
countries to determine their perceived level of corruption. Based on these 
surveys, they rank countries in terms of the degree to which corruption is 
perceived to exist among public officials and politicians. The scores range 
from zero (for highly corrupt countries) to ten (for very low levels of 
perceived corruption). Of the 180 countries surveyed by TI in 2008, China 
was rated as 72
nd (with a score of 3.6), at the same level as Bulgaria, 
Macedonia, Mexico, Peru, Suriname, Swaziland, Trinidad, and Tobago. While 
China is not among the worst countries, the low rating reflects the fact that 
it has a serious problem of corruption. Gregory Chow (2005, p. 4) has 
argued that: 
The major factor that will hinder further economic reform in China, 
in my opinion, is the bureaucratic behavior and corruption of 
government officials. I can easily predict that further reform is 
gradual and slow, as in the past, mainly because there is inertia due 
to vested interests of the bureaucracy and because culture is 
difficult and slow to change. 
 
Farhoomand and Woo (2006, p. 6-15) explain that corruption is an 
extremely complex social behavior. They identify six key forms of corruption 
in China: government or insider control of corporate mechanisms (which 
encourages power manipulation within and outside the organizations), non 
alignment of the personal interest of managers with that of the 
shareholders of companies, the under-developed legal system (which leads 
to ambiguity to as to the definitions of commercial bribery, and thereby 
increasing opportunities for corruption), government officials (who, in order 22 
    
to secure their social status and not to be left out of the money-generating 
opportunities created by the economic reform, build corrupt relationships 
with businessmen), abuse of the ‘guanxi’ network, and a lack of basic social 
values. 
 
The role of corruption in facilitating reforms 
Johnston (2001, p.7) has argued that these forms of corruption may 
have unexpectedly helped to overcome some of the conflicts between state 
power (as represented by its bureaucrats), and the forces promoting the 
economic reforms (as represented by the rapidly emerging entrepreneurs). 
Government bureaucrats, motivated by corrupt purposes, may have 
modified and adapted government policies that would have otherwise 
hindered the economic reforms, as these provided them with attractive 
opportunities for collusion with the entrepreneurs. This, in turn, may have 
promoted China’s extraordinary growth. 
While corruption may have helped lubricate the economic reforms, it 
has potentially explosive consequences for China’s economic and political 
future in the long term, as Johnston (2001, p. 8) and Minxin (2007, p. 1) 
have both argued. Illicit practices, such as bribery, kickbacks, theft, and 
misspending of public money, have cost at least three percent of GDP. This 
corruption may also undermine the legitimacy of the ruling Chinese 
Communist Party, widening inequalities in income between those that are 
benefiting from the economic reforms and those that are being 
marginalized, and so fueling social unrest by inciting popular resentment 
against the highly-visible new rich class of profiting bureaucrats and 
entrepreneurs. 
 
The Chinese government’s response to corruption 
The Chinese Communist Party continues to address corruption 
exercised by party members and government officials. The Supreme 
People's Procuratorate (SPP) recently revealed that more than 9,000 
officials were found guilty of corruption in the first six months of 2009 23 
    
(China Daily, 2009, July 17). Those found guilty are severely punished: for 
example, Li Peiying, the former chief of the Capital Airports Holding 
Company (CAH), was convicted of taking bribes and participating in 
embezzlement, and was subsequently executed in Jinan, capital of east 
China's Shandong province (China Daily, 2009, August 7). Similarly, Chen 
Tonghai, the former chairman of China's second-largest oil company 
Sinopec Corp., was convicted of corruption (for taking close to $28 million in 
bribes), making him one of the most prominent officials from a Chinese 
state company to be punished for graft. He was given a suspended death 
sentence (Oster, 2009). The Chinese government is clearly aware that if 
they don’t control corruption, the governing Communist Party will lose its 
control over the country as did, in the past, the Imperial Qing Court, and 
the Kuomintang government of Chiang Kai-shek.  
Unfortunately, corruption is a common problem to all countries, and 
especially in emerging economies. The solution is a systematic and focused 
effort to promote transparency in the political process and government 
bureaucracies. This requires changes that are not easy to promote because 
of the many conflicting interests, particularly from the politicians benefiting 
from the situation. In 2007, China established the National Bureau of 
Corruption Prevention (NBCP), who report directly to the State Council, in 
order to promote transparency in all levels of government to prevent 
corruption (People’s Daily Online, 2007). This bureau aims to monitor the 
flow of suspicious assets and suspicious corruption activities, by establishing 
an information-sharing system among prosecuting organs, courts, police 
authorities, and banks. 
 
China’s impact on the world 
It is in China’s global interests to show the world that it is restoring its 
past greatness and sophistication, and that the ‘Century of Humiliation’, 
‘Three Bitter Years’, and the ‘Cultural Revolution’ are things of the past.  
Successful sponsoring of the 2008 Olympics in Beijing and the preparations 
for sponsoring the 2010 World Expo in Shanghai have been useful in this 24 
    
regard, and indicate that China possesses a government that can carry out 
whatever it deems necessary to realize its goals. 
 
China’s far-sighted approach 
Zakaria (2009, p. 95) has outlined some reasons for the ability of 
China’s government to take a far-sighted approach in developing its 
economy. He has argued that China simply doesn’t have to respond to the 
public in carrying out their strategy, and so avoids making foolish and 
short-sighted popular political to appease voters. He has cited the US 
government as an example of this short-sighted practice: in order for the 
US government to obtain approval from congress for the much needed 
incentive program to restart its economy after the 2009 recession, it  had to 
accept a lot of unnecessary (and potentially foolish) concessions to satisfy 
the selfish personal interest of Congressmen and Senators, before it was 
possible to obtain their support for a program that would benefit all 
Americans. 
China’s lead over the US in generating electricity from renewable 
sources is an example of its ability to respond quickly. Bradsher (2009), in 
his article in the New York Times, has pointed out that as the US is taking 
its first steps toward mandating that power companies generate more 
electricity from renewable sources, whereas China has implemented a 
similar requirement almost two years ago, and is investing billions of dollars 
to remake itself into a green energy superpower. This year China is on track 
to overtake the US as the world’s largest maker for wind turbines, after 
doubling wind power capacity in each of the last four years. 
 
China’s new role in the world 
China is fast moving to build strong relationships in Latin America, 
filling in the void left by the US, by offering large financing packages to 
countries that are struggling with slowing economies, plunging commodity 
prices, and lack of credit. These problems are largely due to the financial 
crisis, which is attributed US and its excessive neo-liberal economic policies. 25 
    
Most of these developing countries have suffered in the past under the 
policies imposed by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) sponsored by 
US, and have had to privatize their state-owned enterprises, let bad banks 
fail, maintain government spending under control, and keep interest rates 
high so to let the market economy work. Noticeably, in response to its own 
crisis of 2008 the US did exactly the opposite on all four fronts, which has 
perhaps contributed to mistrust in Latin America for the US. 
In the New York Times, Romero and Barrionuevo (2009) have recorded 
that during the first quarter of 2009, China has been negotiating deals to 
double a development fund in Venezuela to $12 billion, has lent Ecuador at 
least $1 billion to build a hydroelectric plant, has provided Argentina with 
access to more than $10 billion in Chinese currency, and has lent Brazil’s 
national oil company $10 billion. They suggest that these deals largely focus 
on China’s ability to protect its interests in natural resources (such as oil) 
for years to come. They also stress that China’s trade with Latin America 
has grown quickly this decade, making it the region’s second largest trading 
partner after the United States. But the size and scope of these loans point 
to a deeper engagement with Latin America, at a time when the influence of 
the US is eroding. Another significant development in global economics is 
the agreement to substitute the dollar with the Chinese Yuan in bilateral 
commerce between China and most Latin America countries. This is 
evidence of China’s push to substitute the Yuan for the dollar as 
international reserve currency. 
The fast growing developing economies of Brazil, Russia, India and China 
(baptized by Goldman Sachs with the acronym BRIC), are challenging the economic 
dominance of the US and the European Union (EU). On June 16, 2009, the leaders of 
the BRIC countries held their first summit in Yekaterinburg, and issued a declaration 
calling for the establishment of a multipolar world order. Particularly, these countries 
have requested a greater influence in the IMF and World Bank (WB), challenging the 
absolute US leadership and the imposition of its excessively liberal market economic 
model that generated the 2008 financial crisis. The IMF and WB (created during the 
Second World War) were traditionally dominated by US ideas and money, and have 
served to spread US influence and business interests over the developing world.26 
    
 
Implications for the US 
The great challenge for the US is its large accumulated debt with 
China, and the need for additional borrowing to finance its massive 
economic stimulus plan. This problem began in the early 80s, when 
Americans began to consume more than they produced, and made up the 
difference by ever-increasing borrowing. At the same time the Chinese were 
saving almost half of their earnings instead of investing in their economy. 
With this ever-growing savings, the Chinese government financed 
consumption in the US to promote China’s exports to American consumers. 
The massive lending by China reduced interest rates in the US, and 
encouraged more and more borrowing and spending by the Americans. The 
excess of low cost financing encouraged Wall Street managers to create 
increasingly riskier financial innovations, in order to boost profits. The 
profits and risks of these financial innovations were carried by investors, 
who were happy to pay extraordinary bonuses for these profits to the Wall 
Street managers that created these financial innovations (at no risk for 
themselves). This encouraged Wall Street managers to create even more 
profitable and increasingly risky financial innovations. This financial merry-
go-round for investors and Wall Street managers ended with the burst of 
the real state bubble that started the 2008 financial crisis. 
 
Figure 2. Leman Brothers: an example of ‘moral hazard’ 27 
  
 




The Lehman Brothers bank is a good example of the ‘moral hazard’ 
that precipitates the financial crisis. This bank made losses in the two 
quarters before it collapsed, yet continued to accrue a compensation pot for 
its employees not far off the levels of 2007 (see Figure 2). Returns to 
shareholders over the entire cycle worsen when the failures of the bank are 
included. Lehman paid out $55 billion to employees in the decade up to the 
end of 2008. Shareholders earned cumulative profits of zero, including the 
loss of all of their capital when the firm failed (The Economist, 2009, July 
16). 
The enormous economic stimulus package recently launched by the US 
government to restart its flailing economy has to be financed by more 
borrowing from China. However, the extent to which the Chinese are willing 
to continue to provide finance the US is now uncertain (Wolf, 2009). In the 
short term, the Chinese government has no choice but to provide finance to 
the US so that the US can continue importing from China. These Chinese 
exports to the US are vital to sustain China’s economic growth. 
Nevertheless, due to perceived lack of sustainability of China’s economic 
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growth model based on exports to the US, it is likely that the Chinese 
government will gradually divert most of their resources invested in US 
treasury bills to develop new markets in Latin America and Africa, and to 
stimulate growth in consumption in their own economy. 
Analyzing US debt and China’s accumulation of a vast pool of capital, 
Zakaria (2009, p. XX) has written in the preface to The post-American 
world: 
The best scenario would be for China and the United States to work 
together to slowly unwind their mutual suicide pact. China would 
benefit by having more money to reinvest in its domestic economy. 
The United States would benefit from being forced to make some 
hard decisions that will ultimately make it better off. Since at least 
the 1980s, America has recognized that it could spend with 
abandon, forever delaying the date of repayment. This has not been 
good for its foreign or domestic policy. It’s made Washington 
arrogant lazy, and careless. But the free ride is coming to an end. 
 
US risks inflation and devaluation of its currency 
The gradual drying up of the supply of low cost financing, previously 
available to the US from China, is likely to increase interest rates in the US. 
Shaky auctions of treasury notes in July 2009 reignited concerns as to 
whether the US government can continue to attract buyers from China and 
elsewhere (to repay trillions in new debt) without raising interest rates 
(Rappaport & Areddy, 2009, July 31). If interest rates have to be raised to 
attract buyers for the US debt, these will certainly discourage the American 
consumer from borrowing and spending. Additionally, the government may 
be forced to print money to pay for its economic stimulus package, without 
being able to finance this. 
The consequence of this for the US could be a prolonged recession, 
inflation and the devaluation of the American dollar. The US will, after 
resolving the financial crisis of 2008, continue to be one of the most 
powerful nations in the world, but it will have to learn to share the world 
leadership with other countries, particularly with Europe, China, and the 29 
    
other BRIC countries. The US, China and the World have to learn how to 
work more effectively together, to learn to respect different ideas, to avoid 
excesses (such as those from Wall Street) and extremism (such as North 
Korea), and to provide a decent living to all people everywhere. This 
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